Editorial from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, written by Bert Pampel

"Strike down. Absolutely! Mercilessly! Immediately!" When the first reports of the uprising in the GDR on 17 June 1953 reached the Soviet leadership in Moscow, Interior Minister Lavrenti P. Beriya was among those who called for a ruthless crackdown. The head of the security apparatus, who had been instrumental in organising Stalin's terror since 1938, had no idea at the time that he would be relieved of his duties ten days later and dead a good six months later. Among the accusations leveled against him at the plenum of the CC of the CPSU in July 1953 was the charge that he had wanted to abandon the GDR at the price of neutrality in a reunited Germany. It illuminates the significance of the events in East Germany for the developments that culminated in the Soviet capital in the summer of 1953.

The events surrounding 17 June 1953 in the GDR have long been extensively researched and documented. This article looks at the Soviet perspective on the satellite state before, during and after the days in June. What part did "the friends", as the Soviet occupiers in the GDR were called both honestly and ironically, play in the escalation of the situation? What impression did they gain of the events? What conclusions did they draw from the uprising? What does a comparative look at the present reveal?

At the beginning of April 1952, Stalin had suggested to the SED leadership an accelerated transformation of state and society in the GDR, which Walter Ulbricht announced three months later at the II Party Conference of the SED as the "planned construction of socialism in the GDR". The measures associated with this, such as nationalisation and centralisation in industry, collectivisation of agriculture, the tightening of the regime on the inner-German border and the forced build-up of "national armed forces" soon led to supply problems. The SED regime, in its tried and tested Stalinist manner, saw these as being due in particular to sabotage by the previous private entrepreneurs and to "the constant intensification of the class struggle", and stepped up criminal justice and propaganda. Between July 1952 and May 1953, the number of prison inmates in the GDR doubled. Growing discontent was increasingly expressed in protests, the first strikes and a mass exodus to the West.

Power struggle over Stalin's succession

In this difficult situation for the SED, Stalin died on 5 March 1953. The Soviet leadership did not take note of the worsening situation in the GDR for a long time because it was preoccupied with itself. The new Soviet Prime Minister Georgi M. Malenkov and Beriya tried to make their mark in both foreign and domestic politics in order to strengthen their own position in the power struggle to succeed Stalin. They signalled to the Western powers their willingness to negotiate on Korea, Austria and Germany. The tone became more conciliatory.

The GDR, the western outpost of the Soviet empire, played a special role in foreign policy considerations. Between mid-April and the end of May 1953, the apparatus produced various position papers on the further policy towards Germany. Even negotiations on the withdrawal of all occupying troops from Germany, free elections and the restoration of state unity were considered in them. However, there were fundamental differences of opinion that absorbed additional attention. For example, on 7 May, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov considered any surrender of the GDR to be out of the question. The main task of the Soviet Union, it was stated in a draft, was "the unswerving implementation of a policy of consolidating the political and economic positions of the GDR". How great the extent of the willingness to compromise actually was is still disputed today.

On 14 May 1953, the dispute over Germany policy came to an end with a report by Beriya on the worsening situation in the GDR. It gradually became clear that the country was in crisis due to the mass exodus of its citizens. Nevertheless, the Minister of the Interior recommended only organisational and political-educational measures to limit the damage. Fundamental course corrections, such as turning away from the "accelerated construction of socialism", were not yet under discussion. The fact that Beriya probably still underestimated the situation was also shown in his memorandum of 19 May 1953 to the Presidium of the CC of the CPSU. In it, he demanded a radical reduction of the staff of the Soviet security organs in the GDR from 2222 to 328 posts and a restriction of their tasks to "advising" GDR state security. Beriya's proposals, which served not least to remove his opponents from important positions, were put into practice.

On 27 May, the Council of Ministers of the USSR again discussed the situation in the GDR. It had before it a paper by the former political adviser to the Soviet Control Commission (SKK) and later High Commissioner Vladimir S. Semyonov, in which he stated bluntly: "The main cause of the unfavourable situation in the GDR is the wrong course under the present conditions towards the forced construction of socialism in the GDR." The fact that this path had been pointed out by Stalin and that his governors, like Semyonov himself, had not tolerated deviations, he passed over in silence. Moscow now feared a collapse of the GDR due to the mass exodus and not as a result of an uprising. The increases in standards decided by the Central Committee of the SED on 13 and 14 May 1953 proved to be the spark.

New instructions from Moscow

Major General Kawersnew, plenipotentiary of the Soviet Ministry of the Interior (MWD) in the GDR, was unusually clear in a report on the domestic situation on 31 May. He considered the repressive approach to collectivisation of agriculture, mistakes made by the GDR government and the SKK in price and wage policy, and "distortions in law enforcement policy" to be the causes of the mass exodus. Workers in Premnitz, Leipzig and Finsterwalde had been on strike since 20 April against the abolition of Christmas bonuses and wage supplements, and against increases in labour standards.

Against the background of the reports arriving from the GDR, the Council of Ministers of the USSR deliberated on 2 June on "measures for the recovery of the political situation in the GDR". For the same day, the SED leadership was summoned to Moscow to order the immediate introduction of a "new course". Behind this was the withdrawal of many of the measures that had been decided in the course of the forced collectivisation of agriculture and the fight against the middle classes and the churches since July 1952. On 9 June, the SED Politburo announced the prescribed New Course - but the increase in standards was not reversed. The 180-degree turnaround did not achieve the desired effect. Instead of dampening the unrest, it led to confusion in the party apparatus and had a mobilising effect on the population, who interpreted the change of course as a declaration of bankruptcy. The first demands for free elections, further strikes and the resignation of the party and state functionaries responsible for the grievances were heard.

A few days later, both the Soviet and SED leaderships were surprised by the uprising. As early as 11.45 a.m. on 16 June, the Berlin Resident's first situation report to Bogdan Z. Kobulov, the deputy interior minister responsible for foreign intelligence, stated that "persons from West Berlin" played "an active role in organising the demonstrations". At 3.40 p.m., Colonel Ivan A. Fadejkin, the new plenipotentiary of the MWD in Germany, reported to Beriya about an "anti-government demonstration" in Stalinallee. The reporter of the government newspaper "Pravda", P. Naumov, noted the slogans of the strikers: "We demand the increase of the standard of living!", "We are workers, not slaves!", "We want to be free people!", "We want butter instead of the people's army!", "HO knocks us out!" The SED party functionaries were incapable of talking to the people, stammering hackneyed phrases or cowardly ducking away.

On the evening of 16 June, the struggle against the increase in standards was replaced by more clearly formulated political slogans. But the Soviet side still exercised restraint and trusted the SED to keep the situation under control. Walter Ulbricht's request to be allowed to give the police the order to shoot was rejected by the Soviet leadership. Only when it became increasingly clear that the GDR security organs could not bring the situation under control did Moscow decide to put down the uprising militarily in the night of 16 to 17 June.

Orchestrated by the East?

As Semyonov recalled, Nikita S. Khrushchev, as well as other members of the Politburo, were of the opinion that "Day X" was imminent and that the West was testing how far it could go against the USSR after Stalin's death. This was a misinterpretation, because the uprising caught Western intelligence services and governments alike off guard. Thus, on 20 June 1953, the Gehlen Organisation, the forerunner of the Federal Intelligence Service, came to the conclusion that the actions had been "staged by the East".

Since 6.30 a.m., Soviet troops occupied all important objects in East Berlin - radio station, post office, telegraph office, railway stations and bridges. At 11 a.m., Fadejkin Berija reported on the crowds and demonstrations: "The police are overwhelmed with the establishment of order. (...) According to all information, the strikes and demonstrations are being directed from West Berlin." For example, the Minister for All-German Affairs, Jakob Kaiser, had come to West Berlin to support the protest movement in the Soviet-controlled sector of the city. Forty-five minutes later, a news report said the demonstrators were calling for the overthrow of the government and that the strike movement had spread to other cities. Ulbricht, Grotewohl and other members of the Politburo fled to the headquarters of the Soviet occupation administration in Berlin-Karlshorst. Since the party and the government were unable to act, the power to govern now rested solely with the Soviet military.

At least 100,000 men and 1,000 tanks were deployed. The martial deployment was intended primarily as a threat. Around noon, the Soviet plenipotentiaries in the GDR received instructions from Moscow to open fire on the insurgents, set up military tribunals and shoot twelve ringleaders. Notices of the executions were to be posted everywhere. But at first the Soviet troops exercised restraint. It was not until around noon that the first shots were fired in East Berlin, mostly over the heads of the insurgents. Senior officers tried to persuade the demonstrators to give up with words. Only when the protesters were not impressed by this, shouted "Russians, go home!" and began storming buildings, was there sharp shooting.

Order to use weapons

At 1 p.m., the site commander for the Soviet sector of Berlin, Major General Pyotr A. Dibrova, announced a state of emergency. Outside Berlin, it was imposed on 167 of the 214 rural and urban districts. A short time later, the Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Defence Minister Marshal Sokolowski arrived in Berlin on Beriya's orders as head of the crisis staff. As the former head of the group of Soviet occupation forces in Germany, he was well acquainted with the conditions. On his arrival he asked, "How could this thing happen, I don't understand." In the afternoon, Semyonov reported to the leadership in Moscow that Soviet and German units had been given the "order to use weapons in necessary cases and to arrest and convict the instigators of the riots". Nevertheless, there was not much bloodshed, probably because tanks and Soviet soldiers were rarely attacked directly.

Beriya sent other confidants to Berlin. In order to "unmask the organisers, ringleaders and instigators of the revolt", 38 operational groups were formed from members of the counterintelligence and the MWD. They were also to interrogate arrested West Berliners who had allegedly been sent to the eastern sector of Berlin by foreign secret services and West German subversive organisations. However, according to Semyonov's later testimony, Beriya's confidants had also been sent to Berlin with the mission of collecting material that proved that Semyonov and Marshal Vasily I. Chuikov, the head of the SKK, had organised the uprising themselves.

While the situation in Berlin had eased by early evening from the Soviet point of view, the uprising continued to develop in other cities, such as Dresden, Jena, Görlitz, Bitterfeld, Halle and especially Magdeburg. There, there was an armed clash between the insurgents and Soviet troops. About 8000 people gathered in front of the prison in the Sudenburg district and demanded the release of the political prisoners. Shots were fired between the demonstrators, who had disarmed guards, and the guards. Soviet tanks finally drove out the besiegers, and later 59 were wounded and seven were killed, including four civilians.

At 1 p.m. on 19 June, Berija's followers reported from Berlin: "On 18 June, military tribunals sentenced 6 of the most active organisers and participants of armed uprisings to death by firing squad, one of them in Berlin, two in Magdeburg, two in Görlitz and one in Jena". Today, there is archival evidence of five executed death sentences by the Soviet occupation forces in the context of 17 June. The number of sentences handed down by Soviet military courts in direct connection with the uprising is estimated at up to eighty. The public show trials of those arrested, as demanded by MWD officials, "in order to expose the fascist organisations of the West in the preparation and execution of the provocation of 17 June in Berlin", did not take place.

The occupiers did not care about the legal situation. According to the Soviet penal code, foreigners could only be prosecuted for crimes committed on the territory of the USSR. The application of Soviet legal norms to crimes committed by Germans in Germany was therefore inadmissible. According to Article 10 of the GDR constitution of 7 October 1949, citizens could not be extradited to a foreign power. It should be noted that although the occupying power had put down the uprising, the legal prosecution was mainly left to the SED judiciary.

Beriya as a scapegoat

On 26 June, Beriya, who had tried to reinvent himself as a de-Staliniser and reformer, was eliminated as a rival for power and arrested. Later, he was made the scapegoat for the mistakes and problems of German policy, in which his rivals themselves had played a decisive role. A short time later, his successor in the MWD corrected the decision to dismantle the Soviet security organs in the GDR, which was "based on a false assessment of the political and operational situation", and restocked the apparatus. However, little changed in the goal set by Beriya: the GDR People's Police and State Security were to be strengthened in order to ensure "order and calm" in the future without the help of Soviet troops.

The Soviet leadership's conclusions from the uprising, however, went far beyond strengthening the GDR repressive apparatus. They aimed at extensive economic support and a domestic and foreign policy upgrading of their governors in East Berlin. In August 1953, Moscow decided, among other things, to waive further reparations payments, to transfer Soviet-owned enterprises to the GDR, to cancel debts and to reduce occupation costs. As a result, wages rose and prices fell - changes that had been among the first demands of the strikers on 16 June.

Heinz Brandt, the Auschwitz survivor and, as an SED functionary, contemporary witness to the events, described the uprising in retrospect as a tragedy, because the masses "brought about the opposite of what they intended". Paradoxically, the SED regime under Walter Ulbricht emerged from the events strengthened. From then on, Soviet policy towards Germany was oriented towards the reality of two German states. The all-German option under the condition of neutrality, which had more advocates in the Soviet leadership than just Beriya, was off the table. The Soviet Union had to accept the integration of West Germany into a Western European and North Atlantic military alliance.

70 years have passed since then. More than nine years ago, Russia first started a war against Ukraine to prevent its closer ties to the West. For the past 16 months, it has been waging an open war against its neighbour. This war and the suppression of the popular uprising in the GDR are events with different preconditions, courses and consequences. Eight years after the end of the Second World War, the GDR, which was not recognised under international law, still resembled an occupied enemy state rather than an independent country. Ukraine's sovereignty, on the other hand, has been recognised even by Russia since 1991. Also, unlike after Stalin's death in 1953, there is no power vacuum in Moscow's leadership today. Nevertheless, parallels to 1953 are emerging with regard to the Russian perception of the situation in Ukraine.

Putin's miscalculations

Once again, the Moscow security apparatus overestimated external influences and factors. In 1953, it believed in the "active involvement of agents of British and American intelligence in provoking the anti-government uprisings". Other reports from the security organs said that the workers had been "instigated by hostile/fascist elements from the West" and had been drawn into a provocation organised by both "West German reactionary circles and foreign secret services". There was no other way to explain in Moscow that workers rose up against a "workers' and peasants' state".

Today, Putin and his apparatus use a similar vocabulary. The government in Kiev is declared a fascist puppet regime supported by the West, the protest on the Maidan, like the uprising of 17 June, a coup financed by the West. Putin, like his predecessors in the security apparatus in 1953, misjudged the desire of the masses for independence and national self-determination. His misjudgement is also reflected in the belief that the Russian offensive army could conquer Ukraine in a few days with half its force. Just as the GDR was not a self-determined country for Moscow in 1953 and the victorious power of the Second World War did not accept that the Germans rebelled against dictatorship and foreign rule, Putin today denies Ukraine its state sovereignty because for him there must be no independent and democratic Ukraine.

source: FAZ - Der Volksaufstand vom 17. Juni 1953 aus sowjetischer Sicht: Der Tag X

Translated by me with the help of https://www.deepl.com/